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Miranda Cole is a partner based in the firm’s Brussels office.  She practices competition and communications law and policy, and has more than 15 years of experience in the field.  Ms. Cole’s competition law expertise encompasses merger control, actions under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, advisory work and actions before the European courts in Luxembourg.

She has particular expertise in advising companies active in the technology and communications sectors in complex and strategic regulatory and policy matters, with particular expertise regarding the impact of evolving regulatory frameworks on new technologies and services.  In the communications sector she has extensive experience advising in connection with all aspects of European and international regulation, policy and competition law, and counselling in connection with the impact of regulation on transactions.

On 6 October 2021, a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in Sumal confirmed that follow-on damages actions can be brought against subsidiaries of companies found to have infringed EU competition law. This note briefly analyzes the judgment and the implications thereof.

Continue Reading The CJEU’s Sumal Judgment: Parental Liability is “Going Down”

In May 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) published the summary of an appeal filed by the International Skating Union (“ISU”) against a ruling from the General Court (“GC”) which found that ISU rules restricting athletes from taking part in rival events infringed Article 101 TFEU. At the same time, a Spanish judge referred questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerning the compatibility of UEFA and FIFA regulations with EU competition law, which forced UEFA, the governing body of European football, to suspend disciplinary proceedings against members of the recent European Super League (“ESL”) that have not yet abandoned the project (i.e., Juventus, Barcelona and Real Madrid). This note briefly analyzes how the CJEU’s ruling on the ISU case could frame the response to the reference from the Spanish court.

Continue Reading The potential implications of the CJEU’s ISU judgement on the European Super League: Football “on thin ice”

Introduction

The wide understanding of the notion of “undertaking” affords the European Commission (“Commission”) broad discretion when identifying the entities liable for competition law infringements, enabling it to attribute liability to all companies that constitute a single economic unit, such that a parent company can be liable for the wrongdoings of its subsidiary. The Commission also relies on the principle of economic continuity to establish liability when corporate groups are reconstructed.

With the increase of private competition law enforcement, the question arises whether individuals may rely on these concepts when establishing liability in private lawsuits. The recent Sumal and Skanska cases confirm that EU Courts are in favour of extending the doctrine of “undertaking” to private damages claims. In his opinion of 15 April 2021 in Sumal, Advocate General (“AG”) Pitruzzella  proposes that a national court can order a subsidiary to pay compensation for the harm caused by anticompetitive conduct of its parent company. In March, the CJEU decided, in Skanska, that the principle of economic continuity applies in the context of follow-on damages claims.
Continue Reading EU Courts extend the doctrine of “undertaking” to private claims for damages

On 25 March 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) dismissed the appeals by Lundbeck, Merck KGaA (and Generics UK), Arrow, Alpharma (and Xellia) and Ranbaxy, against the General Court’s (“GC”) judgment upholding the European Commission’s (“Commission”) 2013 pay-for-delay infringement decision.

Background

The case concerns the antidepressant containing the active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”) citalopram.  Lundbeck’s patents for the API and two processes to produce it were protected in a number of European countries until 2003 (“Lundbeck’s original patents”).  Over time, Lundbeck developed other processes for the production of citalopram, in respect of which it obtained various patents (“Lundbeck’s new process patents”).

In 2002, Lundbeck entered into settlement agreements concerning potential launches of generic versions of citalopram with Generics UK (at the time an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Merck KGaA), Alpharma, Arrow and Ranbaxy.  Under the agreements, Lundbeck made payments to these producers of generic citalopram (“Other Providers”) in various forms (e.g., direct payments, purchase of generic citalopram stock for destruction, and guaranteed profits in a distribution agreement).  In exchange, the Other Providers agreed to cease or refrain from selling generic citalopram in the EEA as a whole or in specific Member States.

In 2013, the Commission adopted an infringement Decision against Lundbeck and each of the Other Providers, concluding that the agreements were “by object” restrictions of competition.
Continue Reading The CJEU’s Lundbeck judgment

On 26 March 2021, the European Commission (“Commission”) published a Staff Working Paper summarising the findings of its evaluation of procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control (the “Evaluation”), along with a communication providing guidance regarding its change in approach to the use of Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”) to refer cases over which neither the Commission nor the member states have jurisdiction (“Guidance”). Additionally, the Commission launched an impact assessment on policy options for further targeting and simplification of merger procedures, inviting stakeholders to submit their views by 18 June 2021.
Continue Reading Commission provides guidance regarding its Article 22 policy change

Yesterday, the European Commission published its proposals for the Digital Markets Act (“DMA Proposal”) and Digital Services Act (“DSA Proposal”), proposing new regulation of “intermediary services” and “designated gatekeepers”. The proposals would impose new obligations on providers of digital services and augment enforcement powers.
Continue Reading Digital Markets Act Proposal

The Enterprise Act 2002 (“EA02”) affords the CMA broad discretion in asserting jurisdiction over mergers that may affect a UK market. Under the EA02, a relevant merger situation (“RMS”) exists where (i) two or more enterprises cease to be distinct; and (ii) either the UK turnover of the target exceeds £70 million (the “turnover test”) or the parties supply or acquire at least 25% of a particular good or service in the UK (the “share of supply test”).

The first limb of the RMS test can be satisfied by the acquisition of de jure control, of de facto control (where it is able to control another company’s policy without holding a majority of the voting rights) or of material influence (where it can directly or indirectly materially influence policy without having a controlling interest ). The material influence test continues to be subject to significant debate.

The second limb of the RMS test aims to ensure that a transaction has sufficient nexus to the UK. The share of supply test is designed to enable the review of transactions which, while they do not trigger the turnover test, are of competitive significance in the UK. This share of supply test has been central to the CMA’s expansive assertion of jurisdiction in a number of recent cases. In Amazon/Deliveroo the CMA took an expansive approach to the notion of material influence. In Sabre/Farelogix the CMA adopted an expansive interpretation of what constitutes the supply of services in the UK, and it also took an expansive approach to the share of supply test in each of Roche/Spark and Google/Looker.


Continue Reading The CMA’s approach to jurisdiction in recent merger cases

On 22 April 2020, the UK Competition and Market Authority (“CMA”) published its guidance on ‘Merger assessments during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic’ (“the guidance”). Prior to the publication of the guidance, there was some speculation about whether the CMA would be more willing to accept ‘failing firm’ arguments as the economic impact of COVID-19 hit home. However, while the CMA has, as it acknowledged, “been working closely with the government to relax competition law where appropriate”, the guidance and a number of recent CMA cases make it clear that the CMA is not relaxing its merger assessments in response to COVID-19.

Continue Reading The CMA’s Guidance on Merger Assessments During the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic and Recent CMA Cases

Under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), an undertaking may abuse its dominant position by “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices”.  The UK Court of Appeal recently provided guidance regarding the legal test to determine whether pricing is excessive and unfair.  In March, it dismissed the UK Competition and Markets Authority’s (“CMA”) appeal in the Phenytoin case.
Continue Reading The UK Court of Appeal Clarifies the Legal Test for Excessive Pricing

In his speech in Austin, Texas in 2019[1] and subsequent interviews,[2] the Chairman of the French Electronic Communications and Postal Regulatory Authority (ARCEP) and former general rapporteur at the French Competition Authority, Sébastien Soriano, suggested that it is no longer appropriate to apply the “Schumpeterian paradigm” to technology companies that he characterised as having reached “… a critical size making it unlikely that external innovation will reverse the situation”.

Since then, Mr. Soriano has spoken about addressing the market power of “prevailing platforms”(“plateformes structurantes”). Last week, ARCEP defined “prevailing platforms” in a strategic note “Prevailing digital platforms – Elements of reflection relating to their characterization”.[3] This strategic note effects the shift in approach that Mr Soriano proposed.

Taking into account the current definitions of digital platforms, ARCEP has defined “prevailing digital platforms” as follows:

online platform operators or operating system providers which, in particular because of their intermediation activity in accessing internet services and content, and because of their importance, are able to significantly limit the ability of users to engage in economic activity or communicate online”.

To determine whether a given operator falls within this definition, ARCEP has set out a set of indices (partly based on the criteria used by the European Commission to characterise operators with significant market power in the electronic communications sector).
Continue Reading The French telecoms regulator has entered the fray “prevailing digital platform”