As part of “A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net Zero Age” to respond to the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) (see our alert), the European Commission (the “Commission”) adopted on 9 March 2023 its Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia (the “TCTF”). The text amends the Temporary Crisis Framework last amended on 28 October 2022 (see our blog). 

These are the three most important things you need to know about the TCTF:

  • To avoid that an investment would be located outside the European Economic Area (EEA), EU countries may support investments in the manufacturing of relevant equipment for the transition towards a net-zero economy, such as batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, heat pumps, carbon capture usage and storage (CCUS), as well as their key components and critical raw materials necessary for their production. They may even grant aid matching foreign subsidies to support those investments, provided that they are located in the poorer areas of the EU.
  • EU countries’ possibilities to grant aid for accelerating the rollout of renewable energy are extended to any renewable technologies, including hydropower, and no longer require a bidding process to select the aided projects that are considered as less mature.
  • The TCTF is not a subsidy program, and it is up to EU Member States to provide public funding.

Continue Reading The Commission adopts its Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework relaxing State aid rules as a response to the US Inflation Reduction Act

On 12 January 2023, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) published its long-awaited judgment in C‑883/19 P HSBC v Commission.

The ECJ confirmed that HSBC had engaged in anti-competitive conduct but partially overturned the General Court’s (“GC”) judgment on procedural grounds. The judgment provides critical guidance on the nature of anticompetitive information exchanges in the financial services sector and sets out important procedural aspects regarding “hybrid” cartel investigations.

The ECJ, having considered the points of appeal, exercised its discretion to issue a final judgment, in place of the GC’s judgment.Continue Reading ECJ clarifies presumption of innocence in hybrid investigations and scope of restrictions by object in information exchanges (HSBC v Commission)

On the heels of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions, and U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan, 2022 accelerated a sweeping effort within the U.S. government to make national security considerations—especially with respect to China—a key feature of new and existing regulatory processes. This trend toward broader national security regulation, designed to help maintain U.S. strategic advantage, has support from both Republicans and Democrats, including from the Biden Administration. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s remarks in September 2022 capture the tone shift in Washington: “…[W]e have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining ‘relative’ advantages over competitors in certain key technologies…That is not the strategic environment we are in today…[w]e must maintain as large of a lead as possible.”

This environment produced important legislative and regulatory developments in 2022, including the CHIPS and Science Act (Covington alert), first-ever Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines promulgated by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or the “Committee”) (Covington alert), President Biden’s Executive Order on CFIUS (Covington alert), new restrictions under U.S. export control authorities targeting China (Covington alert), and proposals for a new regime to review outbound investments by U.S. businesses (Covington alert). The common thread among these developments is the U.S. government’s continuing appetite to use both existing and new regulatory authorities to address identified national security risks, especially where perceived risks relate to China.

With a Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives riding the tailwinds of this bipartisan consensus, 2023 is looking like a pivotal moment for national security regulation—expanding beyond the use of traditional authorities such as trade controls and CFIUS, into additional regulatory domains touching upon data, communications, antitrust, and possibly more. In parallel, the U.S. focus on national security continues to gain purchase abroad, with foreign direct investment (“FDI”) regimes maturing in tandem with CFIUS, and outbound investment screening gaining traction, for example, in the European Union (“EU”). It is crucial for businesses to be aware of these developments and to approach U.S. regulatory processes with a sensitivity towards the shifting national security undercurrents described in greater detail below.Continue Reading Will 2023 Be an Inflection Point in National Security Regulation?

The Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) will apply from 2 May 2023. To facilitate its implementation, the European Commission (“Commission”) aims to publish an accompanying DMA Implementing Regulation  (“IR”). In anticipation of this, the Commission has sought feedback via a public consultation on the draft IR between early December and 9 January 2023.

The draft IR addresses a range of procedural aspects concerning the DMA, including gatekeeper designation and core platform service notifications, opening of proceedings, the right to be heard, and access to the file. By contrast, the draft IR is silent on the Commission’s investigative powers during the gatekeeper designation process and the process of further specifying the obligations set out in Article 6 DMA (both of which gatekeepers will undoubtedly be eager to learn more about).

The Commission is aiming to publish the final IR “well before” the DMA starts applying in May 2023, and it will apply from the same date as the DMA. Whilst the draft IR may still be subject to changes before the final version is adopted, it already provides valuable insights into the Commission’s thinking. How stakeholder feedback might affect the position as currently set out in the final IR remains to be seen.

Two themes in the draft IR – each further outlined below – are particularly noteworthy:

  • First, it touches upon the potential delineations of core platform service under the DMA, an issue which can have important ramifications for future enforcement: delineating one core platform service from other services in the context of digital ecosystems which are often designed to be seamless could prove rather complex.
  • Second, the draft IR displays a certain tension between achieving a “rapid and effective investigatory and enforcement process” (Recital 3 IR) while also ensuring that rights of the defence of the parties to the proceedings are effectively protected. The Commission’s emphasis on speed in DMA enforcement may require some notable departures from the traditional procedural framework for antitrust.

Continue Reading Countdown to Compliance: the DMA Implementing Regulation

European Union (“EU”) Foreign Subsidies Regulation (“FSR”), a new state aid instrument adopted at the end of 2022, will have a significant impact on transactions in the EU. The FSR impacts any company that is present in or wants the enter the EU, and has received financial support in any form from non-EU governments. 

The

Continue Reading EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation – Key Takeaways

Sustainability governs all policies and sectors of social and economic life. The goal of sustainable development is to meet the needs of today’s generations without compromising the self-sufficiency of future generations. Companies are called upon to innovate as economic conditions indicate a change in the direction of sustainability. Sustainability considerations and green developments have increasingly caught the attention of competition law’s enforcers. Competition authorities such as the European Commission (“Commission”), the Hellenic Competition Commission (“HCC”), the Dutch Competition Authority (“ACM”) and the German Competition Authority (“Bka”) have taken a positive stance towards accepting sustainability initiatives proposed by the private sector. How can companies balance both sustainability and competition law? In this blog post, we analyze recent developments that further explain the sustainability framework that companies have to navigate.Continue Reading Building a sustainability strategy – what companies can (not) do from a competition law perspective

On Episode 20 of Covington’s Inside Privacy Audiocast, Dan Cooper, Co-Chair of Covington’s Data Privacy and Cyber Security practice, and Christian Ahlborn, Partner in Covington’s Competition practice, discuss the recently enacted EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) in the first part of our “Competition and Privacy” mini series.

For more information on the DMA

Continue Reading Inside Privacy Audiocast: Episode 20 – Competition and Privacy Series: The EU’s Digital Markets Act

On January 5, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued a groundbreaking proposed rule that would, if finalized:

  • prohibit most employers from entering into non-compete clauses with workers, including employees and individual independent contractors;
  • prohibit such employers from maintaining non-compete clauses with workers or representing to a worker that the worker is subject to a non-compete clause; and
  • require employers to rescind any existing non-compete clause with workers by the compliance date of the rule and notify the affected workers that their non-compete clause is no longer in effect.

The FTC’s notice of proposed rulemaking explains that the FTC considered possible limitations on the rule—such as excluding senior executives or highly paid employees from the ban—but it ultimately proposed a categorical ban on non-competes.  The only exception is for non-competes related to the sale of a business.  However, even this exception is unusually narrow: it would only apply to selling business owners who own at least 25% percent of the business being sold.  (The proposal also would not apply to most non-profits, certain financial institutions, common carriers, and others who are also outside the scope of FTC regulation.)

As discussed in Covington’s January 5 client alert, the FTC explained that it issued the proposed rule due to its belief that non-competes reduce wages, stifle innovation and business, and are exploitative and unnecessary. Continue Reading FTC Proposes Rule to Ban Most Non-Competes

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR) entered into force on 12 January 2023 and will start to apply as of 12 July 2023.

The FSR creates a brand new instrument to fill a regulatory gap, by preventing foreign subsidies from distorting the European Union (EU) internal market. Whereas companies receiving public support in the EU are subject to strict State aid rules, companies obtaining public support outside the EU are generally not. This was perceived as putting companies in the EU at a disadvantage compared to companies that obtained subsidies outside the EU, but that also engaged in economic activity in the Union.

The FSR’s scope extends far beyond the obvious State support, to cover common types of benefits that are granted all over the world, including in countries driven by a market economy. Its obligations will inevitably place an additional administrative burden on companies engaging in an economic activity in the EU. Acceptance of a foreign subsidy distorting the EU internal market may have far-reaching consequences for the company. The FSR places additional compliance obligations on companies, and for many will entail a thorough assessment to identify and justify foreign subsidies received. For companies considering transactions in the EU, the FSR effectively creates a third layer of deal conditionality, besides merger control and Foreign Direct Investment laws. This is adding a further unique set of thresholds, timings and factual considerations, to be included in companies’ strategies to invest in the EU. This will require expertise in EU antitrust and State aid law, and a good understanding of the details of the FSR.

Key things you need to know:

  • As under EU State aid law, a foreign subsidy includes any form of public support granted by a third country, e.g., direct grants, capital injections, interest-free or low-interest loans, etc., but also support such as tax exemptions or reductions, and exclusive rights without proper remuneration.
  • From 12 October 2023, when acquiring control of a company in the EU or participating in a public tender in the EU, companies will have to notify the European Commission (Commission) of foreign subsidies received, if the relevant thresholds are met, or if the Commission so requests. Notifications have suspensive effect. Failure to notify may lead to severe sanctions.
  • The Commission may launch ex officio investigations into other market situations that are not already caught by other legislation.
  • If the Commission deems that a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market, the beneficiary may need to apply remedies, such as reducing its market presence. If these remedies are not effective, the Commission may prohibit a concentration or the award of a public procurement contract that is not yet closed.

Continue Reading The EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation enters into force

On 4 January 2023, the UK’s new subsidy control regime came into force, implementing a new subsidy regulation framework designed for the post-Brexit era.  Underpinned by the Subsidy Control Act 2022 (the “Act”), related statutory instruments and government guidance, the new regime aims to grant public authorities the power to design and award subsidies in an agile way while complying with the UK’s international commitments on subsidy control.   Key things you need to know:

  • The UK’s new subsidy control regime seeks to provide a framework that allows public authorities to award subsidies efficiently, while ensuring that such subsidies do not distort the domestic market or fall foul of the UK’s international commitments on subsidy control.
  • Public authorities are responsible for self-assessing a proposed subsidy or scheme’s compliance with the regime’s requirements.
  • Proposed Subsidies and Schemes of Interest (“SSoIs”) and Particular Interest (“SSoPIs”), i.e. subsidies above certain thresholds or of certain importance, are subject to referral – voluntary (for SSoIs) and mandatory (for SSoPIs) – to the Competition and Market Authority’s Subsidy Advice Unit (“SAU”), which will provide non-binding advice regarding the proposed subsidy. The Government can exercise a “call-in” referral power, i.e. refer a subsidy or scheme to the SAU for review.
  • Subsidies that qualify for assessment under a “Streamlined Route” (“SR”), i.e. subsidies that are less likely to cause distortions on the market and meet the relevant criteria set out by legislation, will not be subject to referral or the Government’s call-in powers.
  • An awarded subsidy can be challenged in court, though during a relatively short (in many cases 30-day) window. A range of remedies are available to challenging parties, including prohibition, injunctions and recovery orders.

Continue Reading The UK’s new subsidy control regime comes into force