Vestager outlines portfolio plans in European Parliament confirmation hearing

After her confirmation hearing in front of the European Parliament on Tuesday 8 October, Magrethe Vestager looks certain to remain as Competition Commissioner for a second term and to combine that with a broader responsibility for digital policy development. Both the second term and the combination of the competition portfolio with a policy brief are unprecedented in recent decades.

Several key points, including the way in which she intends to manage digital matters and a potential conflict of interest, emerged from the hearing.

Margrethe Vestager re-appointed as Competition Commissioner and given a broader digital mandate

By Johan Ysewyn, Miranda Cole, Peter Camesasca, Kevin Coates and Jérôme de Ponsay on September 11, 2019 Posted in Antitrust, Competition Law, Competition Law in Europe, Digital, European Commission

On 10 September 2019, Margrethe Vestager was proposed as the European Commissioner for Competition, a post which she has held since November 2014. The appointment is still subject to the confirmation of the European Parliament.

Vestager has also been given the role of Executive Vice President, with the mandate of making “Europe Fit for the Digital Age”.

In her Mission Letter to Vestager, incoming European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she wanted Vestager to focus on strengthening competition enforcement in all sectors, by improving case detection, speeding up investigations and encouraging cooperation between national competition authorities on both an EU and global level. Vestager is also set to review EU competition rules on antitrust, merger control and State aid. Von der Leyen expects Vestager to do so by using the tool of sector enquiries. She is also expected to develop policies to tackle the effects of foreign State ownership and subsidies in the EU and share market knowledge within the European Commission, particularly in relation to the digital sector.

Vestager’s additional role of Executive Vice President (“Europe fit for the Digital Age”) makes her responsible for addressing issues of cybersecurity, technological sovereignty and artificial intelligence across Europe. When asked by reporters how she planned to balance this new role with that at the DG COMP, Vestager clarified that she had “no intention” of trying to do all the work herself; rather, “the task is to make a sufficiently strong team among commissioners to make sure we can make things happen”. The choice to entrust Vestager with both roles may mean that there will be a closer relationship between competition enforcement and regulatory policy in digital markets.

The EU Commission’s cartel fining challenges: a need to “re-fine” the method?

By Laura Corbett and Peter Camesasca on September 2, 2019 Posted in Cartels, Competition, Enforcement, Fines

Fines are integral to EU cartel enforcement and subject to careful methodology and review. The European Commission (“EC”) determines cartel fines in accordance with the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (the “Fining Guidelines”). The Fining Guidelines set the value of sales of goods or services to which the infringement relates as the proxy that forms the basis of the fine calculation. The value of sales, together with the duration of the infringement, is considered “an appropriate proxy to reflect the economic importance of the infringement as well as the relative weight of each undertaking in the infringement”.

The proportion of the sales value taken into account will depend on the degree of gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the number of years of the infringement, and will be set at a level of up to 30%. However, point 37 of the Fining Guidelines enables the EC to depart from the usual methodology where the peculiarities of the case, or the need to achieve a deterrent effect so require.

Implemented in 2006, the Fining Guidelines have since come of age and in recent cases – mostly in the financial services industry – the EC has started to apply point 37 to accommodate increasingly complex infringements and sectors, rather than as an instrument to wriggle it out of the occasional fining impasse. Does this mean the Fining Guidelines are ripe for an overhaul? Or can the use of point 37 cater for all situations in which the standard methodology falls short? Continue Reading

The European Commission’s guidance on passing-on damages calculation

By Louise Freeman and Daniel Muheme on August 19, 2019 Posted in Antitrust, Cartels, Competition Law, Competition Law in Europe, Damages, Enforcement, European Commission

The European Commission (“EC”) has recently published Guidelines for national courts on how to estimate the share of the overcharge caused by cartels which was passed on by direct purchasers to their customers (“Passing-on Guidelines”). The Passing-on Guidelines provide an extensive practical overview of the applicable legal context, the relevant economic theory and quantification methods for the concrete harm caused to claimants in litigation. Continue Reading

Covington Alert: DOJ to Credit Compliance Programs and Consider Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Cartel Cases

By Covington Competition on July 26, 2019 Posted in Antitrust, Cartels, Competition, Competition Law

On July 11, 2019, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim announced fundamental and sweeping changes to the Division’s approach to corporate compliance policies that will bring it into line with other Department of Justice branches. In every case, the Division will now consider compliance programs in deciding whether to file criminal charges and in calculating fines. Also, when a company faces charges, Division prosecutors may now consider proceeding by way of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) rather than requiring companies to plead guilty. These policy shifts could be the most significant changes to U.S. criminal antitrust enforcement since the Division adopted its Corporate Leniency Policy more than 25 years ago. This Covington Alert will discuss how the policy change departs from longstanding DOJ practice, the significance of the change to corporations that face potential risk in cartel investigations, and the many unanswered questions about how the DOJ will apply the policy.

Advanced Competition Law Conference London – Joint Presentation on Recent EU Cartel Enforcement

By Covington Competition on June 26, 2019 Posted in Antitrust, Cartels, Competition Law in Europe, Enforcement, European Commission, Investigations

On 14 May, Johan Ysewyn and Dirk Van Erps (DG COMP) gave a presentation on recent EU cartel enforcement at the annual Advanced EU Competition Law Conference in London. Their presentation covered developments in enforcement, policy, and court review between May 2018 and May 2019.

There was not much cartel enforcement by the European Commission (“EC”) during the time period covered by the review. The EC issued only one settlement decision in Occupant Safety Systems II, which was triggered by an immunity application. The decision covered two separate cartels, which lasted from 2007 to 2011 and from 2008 to 2011, respectively. Both cartels involved the exchange of commercially sensitive information and price coordination for the supply of seatbelts, airbags, and steering wheels to Volkswagen and BMW, respectively.

Covington Alert: Implications and Questions Arising From The Supreme Court’s Antitrust Ruling in Apple, Inc. v. Pepper

By Geoffrey Kalantari on May 24, 2019 Posted in Antitrust, Competition Law, Damages, Technology

On May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court (“the Court”) announced its 5-4 decision in Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, permitting iPhone users to proceed with an antitrust suit against Apple alleging that it monopolized the retail market for iPhone apps. The Court emphasized that it decided only the threshold issue, ruling that the iPhone users were not barred by federal law from bringing the suit, and did not address the merits of the claims. The Court concluded that consumers could bring suit against Apple because they purchased apps directly from Apple—through the Apple App Store— even if app developers (and not Apple) were setting the retail price of the apps. In this Covington Alert, Thomas Barnett, Beth Brinkmann and Derek Ludwin discuss the decision as well as a number of questions that it raises about the Supreme Court’s antitrust precedents relating to direct and indirect purchasers.

Covington Alert: English Competition Appeals Tribunal to Reconsider £14 Billion Class Action Against MasterCard

By Geoffrey Kalantari on May 14, 2019 Posted in Banking & Finance, Competition Law, Competition Law in Europe, Damages, United Kingdom

On 16 April 2019, England’s Court of Appeal ruled that the Competition Appeals Tribunal (the “CAT”) had erred in rejecting certification of former financial ombudsman Walter Merricks’ class action against MasterCard, for £14 billion. As a result, the CAT will now reconsider whether to certify the class. The decision has lowered the bar that will need to be cleared in this and future class actions in order to achieve certification. Louise Freeman and Harry Denlegh-Maxwell consider the decision and its implications for the UK’s fledgling class action regime in this Covington Alert.

The European Commission publishes report on EU loan syndication and its impact on competition in credit markets

By Johan Ysewyn and Daniel Muheme on April 29, 2019 Posted in Antitrust, Banking & Finance, Cartels, Competition Law, Competition Law in Europe, European Commission

On 5 April 2019, the European Commission (“EC”) published a report – prepared by Europe Economics at the request of DG COMP – on EU loan syndication and its impact on competition in credit markets (the “Report”).

The Report describes the functioning of the syndicated loan business and seeks to assess whether there are potential competition concerns with regard to syndicated loans in leveraged buy-outs (“LBOs”), project finance (“PF”) and infrastructure projects (“INFRA”). Syndicated loans are considered to be an important source of finance to the European economy. The EC’s interest in this business is therefore primarily motivated by an assessment of its effectiveness and functioning besides potential competition concerns. Geographically, the Report focuses on France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK. These countries account for approx. 75% of syndicated lending volume in the identified segments in the EU, with Poland making up the smallest share of the group.

Economic successors can be held liable for damages resulting from Article 101 TFEU infringements

By Melissa Van Schoorisse on March 26, 2019 Posted in Cartels, Damages

On 14 March 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) issued a preliminary ruling in Case C-724/17 Vantaan kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy and Others, holding that the principle of economic continuity applies in actions for damages resulting from infringements of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). The judgment followed a preliminary reference from the Supreme Court of Finland, submitted in the course of proceedings regarding an asphalt cartel in the Finnish market. Continue Reading