For more than twenty years, FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”) have sought to balance the stability of football teams with player mobility. That balance was fundamentally challenged by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the “Court”) in Case C-650/22 FIFA v Diarra (“Diarra”).

Less than two years later, on 10 June 2026, FIFA approved a new version of the RSTP due to officially enter into force on 1 January 2027.

The reform represents the most comprehensive overhaul of the transfer system since the introduction of the modern RSTP in 2001. While it responds directly to Diarra, it also reflects the ECJ’s insistence – primarily expressed in Superleague – that sports governing bodies must pursue legitimate objectives through rules that are transparent, objective and proportionate. Moreover, alongside the substantive amendments to the RSTP, FIFA introduced a new governance model under which future changes to the RSTP will be developed through structured social dialogue among players, clubs and leagues.

This blog examines the key EU competition law and free movement implications of the new RSTP. In particular, it considers how the revised rules reflect the principles identified in previous ECJ case law and how they reshape the competitive and regulatory framework governing player transfers.

Continue Reading From Diarra to FIFA’s New Player Transfer System: How EU Law is Reshaping Football’s Transfer Rules and Governance

I. Introduction

On 3 August 2026, the President of the EU General Court issued an order addressing the scope of legal privilege under EU law. The order dismissed Broadcom’s application to suspend a decision by the European Commission requiring the production of documents in its investigation into Broadcom’s allegedly abusive software licensing practices.

The purpose of Broadcom’s application for interim measures was to enable it to withhold certain documents until the EU General Court rules on the main appeal against the decision.  In the main appeal, Broadcom had argued that the Commission’s decision was unlawful in so far as it compelled the production of documents that were privileged under the laws of third countries, such as the United States.

Although issued in interim proceedings and on well-established points of law, the order provides welcome guidance on the right balance between the European Commission’s investigative powers and the parties’ rights of defence. The President of the EU General Court highlights with unprecedented clarity the fundamental importance of legal privilege as a core part of procedural fairness in EU competition investigations.

That reasoning, and the further discussion on the European Commission’s practice in relation to legal advice from non-EU external lawyers, should help companies navigate the complexities of maintaining privilege over legal advice they receive, especially in global competition investigations.

Continue Reading In or out?  Navigating Legal Privilege in EU Competition Investigations post-Broadcom

Introduction

On August 5, 2026, NHV Group announced that its proposed acquisition by GD Helicopter Finance (“GDHF”), ultimately controlled by China-based GDAT Group, would not proceed after Belgian authorities blocked the transaction under Belgium’s foreign direct investment screening regime, following a review coordinated by the Interfederal Screening Committee (“ISC”). This marks the first public prohibition under Belgium’s foreign direct investment screening mechanism, which has been operational since July 1, 2023. The Committee did not publish detailed reasons for the decision.

While noteworthy, this should not be misread as a shift toward protectionism. Belgium’s FDI statistics show the regime has been overwhelmingly supportive of transactions. The NHV/GDHF case illustrates the regime’s core security function: transactions where critical infrastructure intersects with a geopolitically sensitive investor profile are at the heart of the ISC’s mandate. At the same time, the case sharpens existing criticisms of the regime’s opacity and complexity—criticisms that Belgian authorities are now actively addressing through a public consultation and upcoming EU-level harmonization.

Continue Reading First Prohibition Under Belgium’s FDI Regime: A Milestone, Not a Revolution

On 29 April 2026, the European Commission (“Commission”) adopted its Communication establishing the “Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework” (“METSAF”). The Communication introduces a new State aid framework to mitigate the consequences of the energy price spikes and supply chain disruptions caused by the ongoing hostilities in Iran and the wider region, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (the “Middle East Crisis”). The framework applies from 1 March 2026 to 31 December 2026.

Key takeaways

  • The METSAF is a temporary instrument that makes State aid rules more flexible with the aim of counterbalancing the ongoing energy price spikes due to the Middle East Crisis.
  • Under the METSAF, Member States may exceptionally seek the Commission’s approval to partially compensate companies active in the land transport (rail, road and inland waterways), intra-EU short sea shipping services, agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture sectors to cover extra-costs of fuel or fertilisers incurred due to the Middle East Crisis.
  • Additionally, the METSAF allows Member States to increase the aid intensity of electricity price relief schemes for energy-intensive users under the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (“CISAF”) (see our previous blog).
Continue Reading The Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (METSAF)

What’s changing, and why is it important?

In July 2026, the Ministry of Economy & Tourism of the United Arab Emirates (the “Ministry” and “UAE”) published its Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (the “Guidelines”), providing a detailed look into the Ministry’s framework for market definition assessment. The Ministry considers market definition to be a “fundamental pillar” to the competitive assessment across all competition enforcement contexts and a “crucial stage” in competition enforcement.

The issuance of the Guidelines marks a further important step in the implementation of the UAE’s competition law regime. It follows the introduction of revised merger control thresholds in 2025 and the adoption in April 2026 of implementing regulations for the 2023 Federal Competition Law (see our previous blog on these reforms).

The Guidelines are particularly important for the UAE’s merger control regime, where filing obligations are dependent on parties meeting revenue and/or market share thresholds in the “relevant market” in the UAE. The introduction of the Guidelines provides a crucial tool to merging parties and advisers for determining when transactions may require mandatory notification to the Ministry. More substantively, the Guidelines will provide an important source to help merging parties prepare the “economic report” on the competitive effects of a merger required by the UAE merger notification rules. Beyond merger control, the Guidelines will also provide an important tool for self-assessment of behavioural competition law compliance.

Continue Reading UAE Antitrust Regime Marks an Important Step with the Introduction of Market Definition Guidelines

On 30 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the EU (the “Court”) delivered its judgment in Case C‑133/24 CD Tondela and Others (“Tondela”). The case arose from a preliminary ruling request submitted by a Portuguese court concerning a no-poach agreement entered into by Portuguese professional football clubs during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This…

Continue Reading Tondela (Case C‑133/24): No-Poach Agreements in Sport: Context Always Matters

On 30 April, the UAE adopted Cabinet Decision No. (59) of 2026 (“the 2026 Executive Regulations”), setting out the executive regulations for Federal Decree-Law No. (36) of 2023 on the Regulation of Competition. The 2026 Executive Regulations replace the previous implementing regulations adopted in 2014 under the former UAE competition law. They are expected to enter into force on 30 July 2026.

Taken together, the adoption of Federal Decree-Law 36 on Regulating Competition of 2023, Cabinet Resolution No. (3) of 2025 establishing the new filing thresholds, and the subsequent adoption of the 2026 Executive Regulations complete a long-anticipated overhaul of the UAE merger control framework. These measures mark a decisive shift towards a fully operational and modern merger control regime. The 2026 Executive Regulations significantly streamline the notification process, introduce enhanced timing certainty, and create a clear pathway for third parties to engage with the Competition Department of the Ministry of Economy & Tourism (“Competition Department”) to influence the outcome of merger reviews.

More broadly, the 2026 Executive Regulations introduce important changes to various aspects of UAE’s competition law framework, including measures relating to behavioural competition enforcement and procedures. In combination with other recent competition policy and enforcement actions, the 2026 Executive Regulations signal the UAE’s ambition to bring its competition and merger control framework in line with international best practice.

This article focuses on the main revisions to the UAE merger control framework, before briefly outlining the wider changes introduced to the UAE’s behavioural competition regime by the 2026 Executive Regulations.

Continue Reading The UAE’s New Merger Control Framework: What the 2026 Executive Regulations Mean for Dealmakers

On 10 February 2026, the EU released the agreed compromise text of the new Regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the EU (the “New FIR Regulation”).  The three EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council) reached the compromise on the text in December 2025 (see our blog) following several months of…

Continue Reading New Foreign Investment Screening Regulation – Key Takeaways from the Agreed Compromise Text

On 9 January 2026, the Commission adopted its Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the “FSR Guidelines”). The FSR Guidelines explain how the Commission assesses whether foreign subsidies distort the internal market, and, if so, whether their potential positive effects outweigh their potential negative impacts. They also explain how the Commission may exercise its call-in powers to request the prior notification of any concentration or any foreign financial contributions (“FFCs”) in the context of a public procurement procedure that falls below the notification thresholds.

This blogpost describes the FSR Guidelines. The FSR Guidelines were adopted after a little more than two years of application of the FSR, on which the Commission will report in July 2026, potentially leading to its revision. While they crystallize the Commission’s practice thus far, they do not address the frequently voiced concern that they are overbroad and, consequently, too many unproblematic concentrations or tenders must undergo a cumbersome reporting process. For more details on the FSR, please see our previous blogpost.

Key takeaways

  • The FSR Guidelines offer detailed guidance on how the Commission will conduct its assessment of distortions. While the responsibility for this assessment lies with the Commission, companies under investigation may need to demonstrate that the foreign subsidies they have received are not linked to their economic activities in the EU. If they are unable to do this successfully, they must then provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact those foreign subsidies have on the internal market.  
  • In balancing the potential negative impact of foreign subsidies with their potential positive effects, the FSR Guidelines rely on an approach similar to State aid assessment. However, unlike in State aid, they do not provide any presumption that certain categories of subsidies are on balance positive when defined conditions are met. Instead, they require a case-by-case assessment.  
  • Regarding the Commission’s approach to requesting notification of concentrations or FFCs in the context of a public procurement procedure, the FSR Guidelines leave the Commission broad discretion when it determines that those activities merit prior review given their impact on the EU. As a result, companies may need to consider their FSR risks even if they do not engage in large concentrations or public procurement procedures in the EU.   
Continue Reading The European Commission adopts the Foreign Subsidies Regulation Guidelines

On 20 January, the UK Government announced a consultation on planned reforms to the UK’s merger and markets regime. Key proposed changes include narrowing certain jurisdictional thresholds, centralising Phase II decision-making within the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) Board through removal of the Phase II independent panel (CMA Panel), and the introduction of a new “single-phase” market investigation review process.

Whilst reform may be welcome to businesses in some respects, the proposals are likely to further centralise decision-making power within the CMA, as well as increasing the oversight of Government in the administration of key aspects of the UK’s antitrust regime. For merger decisions in particular, the removal of the CMA Panel, combined with the Government’s commitment to retain the judicial review standard of appeal, may reignite calls for a full merits review standard to be introduced alongside the proposed reforms.

Why now? 

Having gained a reputation for taking bold stances on global mergers with arguably limited nexus to the UK (e.g., Facebook/Giphy and Sabre/Farelogix), the CMA has sometimes been accused of deterring some transactional investments in the UK economy. As part of a wider Regulatory Action Plan, the Government in January 2025 replaced the incumbent CMA Chair, Marcus Bokkerink, with Doug Gurr (formerly a global VP and the head of Amazon UK). The Government also committed to reviewing and narrowing the UK’s notoriously broad jurisdictional thresholds under the Enterprise Act 2002.

A resulting flurry of activity has already seen the CMA prioritising cases that have a direct impact on UK consumers or businesses; adopting a more neutral stance towards behavioural remedies in suitable cases; and promising to increase the pace, predictability, and proportionality (the “4Ps”) of its enforcement activities, in particular for merger reviews.  

The proposed reforms consolidate and entrench this direction of travel.

Continue Reading “Operational transformation” at the CMA -What the latest announcements mean for UK antitrust enforcement