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Alessandro Cogoni

Alessandro Cogoni is an associate in Covington’s competition team. He advises international companies from a wide variety of industries on all aspects of EU competition law, including State aid, foreign subsidies, multi-jurisdictional merger control filings and antitrust investigations.

Contact:Read more about Alessandro CogoniEmail

I. Introduction

On 3 August 2026, the President of the EU General Court issued an order addressing the scope of legal privilege under EU law. The order dismissed Broadcom’s application to suspend a decision by the European Commission requiring the production of documents in its investigation into Broadcom’s allegedly abusive software licensing practices.

The purpose of Broadcom’s application for interim measures was to enable it to withhold certain documents until the EU General Court rules on the main appeal against the decision.  In the main appeal, Broadcom had argued that the Commission’s decision was unlawful in so far as it compelled the production of documents that were privileged under the laws of third countries, such as the United States.

Although issued in interim proceedings and on well-established points of law, the order provides welcome guidance on the right balance between the European Commission’s investigative powers and the parties’ rights of defence. The President of the EU General Court highlights with unprecedented clarity the fundamental importance of legal privilege as a core part of procedural fairness in EU competition investigations.

That reasoning, and the further discussion on the European Commission’s practice in relation to legal advice from non-EU external lawyers, should help companies navigate the complexities of maintaining privilege over legal advice they receive, especially in global competition investigations.

Continue Reading In or out?  Navigating Legal Privilege in EU Competition Investigations post-Broadcom

On 29 April 2026, the European Commission (“Commission”) adopted its Communication establishing the “Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework” (“METSAF”). The Communication introduces a new State aid framework to mitigate the consequences of the energy price spikes and supply chain disruptions caused by the ongoing hostilities in Iran and the wider region, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (the “Middle East Crisis”). The framework applies from 1 March 2026 to 31 December 2026.

Key takeaways

  • The METSAF is a temporary instrument that makes State aid rules more flexible with the aim of counterbalancing the ongoing energy price spikes due to the Middle East Crisis.
  • Under the METSAF, Member States may exceptionally seek the Commission’s approval to partially compensate companies active in the land transport (rail, road and inland waterways), intra-EU short sea shipping services, agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture sectors to cover extra-costs of fuel or fertilisers incurred due to the Middle East Crisis.
  • Additionally, the METSAF allows Member States to increase the aid intensity of electricity price relief schemes for energy-intensive users under the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (“CISAF”) (see our previous blog).
Continue Reading The Middle East Crisis Temporary State Aid Framework (METSAF)

On 9 January 2026, the Commission adopted its Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the “FSR Guidelines”). The FSR Guidelines explain how the Commission assesses whether foreign subsidies distort the internal market, and, if so, whether their potential positive effects outweigh their potential negative impacts. They also explain how the Commission may exercise its call-in powers to request the prior notification of any concentration or any foreign financial contributions (“FFCs”) in the context of a public procurement procedure that falls below the notification thresholds.

This blogpost describes the FSR Guidelines. The FSR Guidelines were adopted after a little more than two years of application of the FSR, on which the Commission will report in July 2026, potentially leading to its revision. While they crystallize the Commission’s practice thus far, they do not address the frequently voiced concern that they are overbroad and, consequently, too many unproblematic concentrations or tenders must undergo a cumbersome reporting process. For more details on the FSR, please see our previous blogpost.

Key takeaways

  • The FSR Guidelines offer detailed guidance on how the Commission will conduct its assessment of distortions. While the responsibility for this assessment lies with the Commission, companies under investigation may need to demonstrate that the foreign subsidies they have received are not linked to their economic activities in the EU. If they are unable to do this successfully, they must then provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact those foreign subsidies have on the internal market.  
  • In balancing the potential negative impact of foreign subsidies with their potential positive effects, the FSR Guidelines rely on an approach similar to State aid assessment. However, unlike in State aid, they do not provide any presumption that certain categories of subsidies are on balance positive when defined conditions are met. Instead, they require a case-by-case assessment.  
  • Regarding the Commission’s approach to requesting notification of concentrations or FFCs in the context of a public procurement procedure, the FSR Guidelines leave the Commission broad discretion when it determines that those activities merit prior review given their impact on the EU. As a result, companies may need to consider their FSR risks even if they do not engage in large concentrations or public procurement procedures in the EU.   
Continue Reading The European Commission adopts the Foreign Subsidies Regulation Guidelines

On June 25, 2025, the European Commission adopted the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF) to promote the EU’s goals for decarbonization and competitiveness. CISAF makes permanent the relaxed State aid compatibility rules adopted under the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF). It will be in effect from June 25, 2025 until December 31…

Continue Reading The European Commission adopts the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework

On 1 December 2024 the 2025-2029 College of Commissioners took office, led by President Ursula von der Leyen in her second term.

This blog explores what companies can expect from the new European Commission in the field of EU State aid.

Key takeaways

  • The Commission will establish a new State aid framework to allow EU Member States to grant State aid for (i) accelerating the roll-out of renewable energy, (ii) deploying industrial decarbonisation, and (iii) ensuring sufficient manufacturing capacity for clean tech “made in Europe” while preserving cohesion objectives.
  • Approval of State aid for Important Projects of Common European Interest (“IPCEIs”) will be made simpler and faster. The Commission may further expand the scope of IPCEIs to include innovations more broadly and possibly manufacturing projects.
  • The Commission will create a ‘European Competitiveness Fund’, aimed at supporting the development of strategic technologies and their manufacturing in the EU. Depending on its design, this fund may help level the playing field among EU Member States.
  • State aid rules will be revised to enable wider housing support measures, notably for energy efficiency and social housing. Other State aid rules will also undergo a revision during the 2025-2029 mandate, such as aid to the transport sector or for companies in difficulty.
Continue Reading State aid – Outlook for the European Commission’s 2025-2029 Mandate

On 1 December 2024 the 2025-2029 College of Commissioners took office, led by President Ursula von der Leyen in her second term. This blog explores what companies can expect from the new Commission regarding the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (“FSR”).

The FSR was adopted in December 2022 to address distortions caused in the EU by foreign subsidies. It introduced two notification tools for prior clearance of concentrations and public procurement procedures – effective since 12 October 2023 – and an ex officio tool for investigations by the Commission into suspicious foreign subsidies – effective since 12 July 2023. For a detailed overview of the FSR, see our previous blog post.

Key takeaways

  • The first year of FSR enforcement has seen a higher number of FSR notifications than the Commission anticipated in its 2021 Impact Assessment, in terms of both transactions and public procurement procedures. The Commission has initiated four in-depth investigations. By contrast, the ex officio tool has rarely been used with only two investigations launched.
  • For its 2025-2029 mandate, the Commission is aiming to vigorously enforce the FSR, especially as regards concentrations.
  • The Commission appears willing to discuss possible amendments to the FSR (in particular, to the public procurement notification thresholds).
Continue Reading The EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation – Outlook for the European Commission’s 2025-2029 Mandate

What are the key take-aways of the mission letter to Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, EVP-designate responsible for EU competition policy?

On 17 September 2024, European Commission (“Commission”) President Ursula von der Leyen (“President”), announced her proposed College of Commissioners (“College”) for her second 5-year term. The Commissioners-designate still need to…

Continue Reading New Commissioner, New Mission, New Policy for Competition?

On 3 September 2024, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) published its highly-anticipated judgment in Illumina/Grail v Commission (Joined Cases C‑611/22 P and C‑625/22 P) (“ECJ Judgment”), regarding the scope of application of Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”).

The ECJ set aside the EU General Court (“GC”) judgment (Case T‑227/21) and ruled that the European Commission (“Commission”) does not have jurisdiction over transactions referred to it by the national competition authorities of EU Member States (“NCAs”) if the transactions do not meet the national thresholds of the referring EU Member States.

Key takeaways

  • Based on a historical, contextual, and teleological interpretation of Article 22 EUMR and the EUMR itself, NCAs cannot ask the Commission to examine transactions which do not meet their national thresholds.
  • Article 22 EUMR provides for a corrective function regarding the allocation of competences between the Commission and NCAs, and is to limit the possibility of multiple parallel notifications, providing legal certainty and facilitating the one-stop shop principle.
  • An amendment of the EUMR thresholds and/or referral rules to capture below-threshold transactions would likely entail a burdensome legislative process and complex negotiations with EU Member States.
  • The Commission can still rely on (i) new thresholds which have by now been introduced in some EU Member States to catch transactions outside the scope of their traditional turnover-based thresholds, and (ii) the possibility for NCAs to review these transactions by means of Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits abuses of a dominant position.
Continue Reading ECJ decides that EU Member States cannot refer below-threshold transactions to the European Commission (Illumina/Grail v Commission)

On 18 July 2024, the current President of the European Commission (“Commission”), Ursula von der Leyen, was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second 5-year term. As part of her reconfirmation, President von der Leyen delivered a speech before the European Parliament, complemented by a 30-page program, which lays down the Commission’s political program for the next five years.

A key pillar of the program – “A new plan for Europe’s sustainable prosperity and competitiveness” – has the objective of combining competitiveness and prosperity with the achievement of the European Green Deal goals.

Specifically on competition policy, according to President von der Leyen, a new approach is needed to achieve this objective. This blog post projects where competition policy is likely headed in the 2024-2029 period by commenting on the most relevant paragraphs of the program.

Continue Reading The 2024-2029 Commission Political Guidelines: Where Is Competition Policy Likely Headed?

On 31 May 2024, the European Commission (“Commission”) adopted an amendment to its Regional aid Guidelines (“RAG”), allowing EU Member States to grant higher amounts of aid to investment projects falling into the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’s (“STEP”) objectives in disadvantaged areas of the EU. STEP is an EU initiative designed to boost the EU’s industrial competitiveness and reinforce EU sovereignty by supporting critical and emerging strategic technologies and their respective value chains.

Key takeaways

  • In the EU, large businesses can only receive State aid from Member States for their large investment projects (“LIPs”) in production facilities if their projects take place in disadvantaged areas of the EU. The conditions to access such State support and the maximum aid amount are laid down in the RAG.
  • STEP’s objectives are to support the development and the manufacturing of clean tech, digital technologies, and bio-tech.
  • The amendment to the RAG allows Member States to grant large businesses higher amounts of aid for their LIPs where they contribute to the STEP objectives.
Continue Reading The Commission amends regional aid rules to foster support for strategic technology projects