Competition Law in Europe

What are the key take-aways of the mission letter to Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, EVP-designate responsible for EU competition policy?

On 17 September 2024, European Commission (“Commission”) President Ursula von der Leyen (“President”), announced her proposed College of Commissioners (“College”) for her second 5-year term. The Commissioners-designate still need to…

Continue Reading New Commissioner, New Mission, New Policy for Competition?

The European Court of Justice released its long-awaited judgment1 in the Google Shopping saga last week, finally putting to bed close to fifteen years’ of scrutiny into Google’s practices of favouring its own comparison shopping service (Google Shopping) over rival shopping services.

In its ruling, the ECJ upheld the General Court’s earlier judgment2 which had rejected Google’s appeal over the European Commission’s decision3 to fine it €2.42 billion for abusing its market dominance as a search engine by systematically favouring Google Shopping in its general search results.

The overall outcome of the ECJ’s reasoning in Google Shopping is perhaps unsurprising to competition law practitioners – given the unwavering direction of travel of the case. The ECJ judgment nevertheless raises a number of interesting points and leaves a number of questions unanswered.

Key takeaways

  • Refusal to supply. The judgment confirmed that not every issue of access necessarily requires the application of the Bronner test of refusal to supply. The ECJ found the Bronner doctrine applies in circumstances where a dominant firm refuses to grant a competitor access to infrastructure which it has developed for its own business needs. However, the ECJ ruled that the Bronner test is not applicable in cases where there is no outright refusal of access to infrastructure – but rather access granted on discriminatory terms (such discrimination being assessed under separate forms of potential abuse).
  • Competition not on the merits. The ECJ accepted Google’s arguments that, to establish an abuse of dominance under Article 102, a two-pronged test applies: (i) that actual or potential anticompetitive effects arise from the abusive conduct; and (ii) that the conduct falls outside of “competition on the merits”. However, in assessing the latter requirement, the ECJ rejected Google’s arguments that only circumstances relating specifically to Google’s conduct are relevant to the assessment. Instead, the ECJ held that, in assessing “competition on the merits”, relevant circumstances regarding the characteristics of the market or the nature of competition are capable of characterising the conduct as falling outside of the scope of competition on the merits.
  • Causality and counterfactual. The ECJ maintained that the causal link is one of the essential elements of a competition law infringement and that, as a result, the burden of proof for such causal link (and hence the counterfactual analysis) lies with the Commission. However, the ECJ found that the counterfactual analysis is just one way to establish causality. Where establishing a credible counterfactual may be “arbitrary or even impossible” (para 231), the Commission cannot be required to systematically establish a counterfactual and can rely on other evidence to establish causality.
  • “As-efficient competitors”. The ECJ reiterated earlier case law that it is not the objective of Article 102 to ensure that less efficient competitors remain on the market but also remarked that this statement did not imply that an abuse of dominance finding does not always require a showing that the conduct was capable of excluding an as-efficient competitor. With respect to the AEC test, the Court held that this is just one way to establish an abuse of dominance.

Continue Reading ECJ’s Google Shopping Judgment: The End of a Long Saga

On 3 September 2024, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) published its highly-anticipated judgment in Illumina/Grail v Commission (Joined Cases C‑611/22 P and C‑625/22 P) (“ECJ Judgment”), regarding the scope of application of Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”).

The ECJ set aside the EU General Court (“GC”) judgment (Case T‑227/21) and ruled that the European Commission (“Commission”) does not have jurisdiction over transactions referred to it by the national competition authorities of EU Member States (“NCAs”) if the transactions do not meet the national thresholds of the referring EU Member States.

Key takeaways

  • Based on a historical, contextual, and teleological interpretation of Article 22 EUMR and the EUMR itself, NCAs cannot ask the Commission to examine transactions which do not meet their national thresholds.
  • Article 22 EUMR provides for a corrective function regarding the allocation of competences between the Commission and NCAs, and is to limit the possibility of multiple parallel notifications, providing legal certainty and facilitating the one-stop shop principle.
  • An amendment of the EUMR thresholds and/or referral rules to capture below-threshold transactions would likely entail a burdensome legislative process and complex negotiations with EU Member States.
  • The Commission can still rely on (i) new thresholds which have by now been introduced in some EU Member States to catch transactions outside the scope of their traditional turnover-based thresholds, and (ii) the possibility for NCAs to review these transactions by means of Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits abuses of a dominant position.

Continue Reading ECJ decides that EU Member States cannot refer below-threshold transactions to the European Commission (Illumina/Grail v Commission)

The European Commission’s draft guidelines on exclusionary abusive conduct by dominant firms under Article 102 TFEU (the “Draft Guidelines”) were published on 1 August 2024. They show a marked change from the 2009 Article 82 [now Article 102] Enforcement Priorities Guidance (the “Priorities Guidance”): economic concepts have largely been replaced with the Commission’s interpretation of the European Courts’ caselaw.

The consultation on the Draft Guidelines is open until 31 October 2024. Practical suggestions rooted in and developing the caselaw appear more likely to influence the Commission’s final version of the Draft Guidelines than statements of economics.Continue Reading From Concept to Precedent: The 2024 Draft Guidelines on Article 102

On 18 July 2024, the current President of the European Commission (“Commission”), Ursula von der Leyen, was reconfirmed by the European Parliament for a second 5-year term. As part of her reconfirmation, President von der Leyen delivered a speech before the European Parliament, complemented by a 30-page program, which lays down the Commission’s political program for the next five years.

A key pillar of the program – “A new plan for Europe’s sustainable prosperity and competitiveness” – has the objective of combining competitiveness and prosperity with the achievement of the European Green Deal goals.

Specifically on competition policy, according to President von der Leyen, a new approach is needed to achieve this objective. This blog post projects where competition policy is likely headed in the 2024-2029 period by commenting on the most relevant paragraphs of the program.Continue Reading The 2024-2029 Commission Political Guidelines: Where Is Competition Policy Likely Headed?

In line with its previous decision-making practice (see our previous sustainability blog posts here and here), on 8 May 2024, the German Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) declared the implementation of a new European industry standard for reusable pot plant trays compatible with competition law.

Since 2021, companies and associations from the European…

Continue Reading FCO gives green light for ‘greener’ plant trays

Based on the 11th Amendment to the German Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, “GWB”) that was passed by the German parliament (Bundestag) on 6 July 2023, the GWB will undergo significant reform (the “Reform”). Among other Reform amendments, attention has focused on the Federal Cartel Office’s (Bundeskartellamt, “FCO”) new powers in the context of sector inquiries (Sektoruntersuchungen). According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz, “BMWK”), the amendments intend to strengthen business opportunities for competitors, start-ups and small / medium sized entities.

For the first time under German competition law, the FCO will obtain powers to take remedial measures following sector inquiries, even where the addressee has not been found to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct. Under the Reform, the FCO will be able to take measures where it identifies a significant and continuing ‘disruption of competition’ (Störung des Wettbewerbs) in the relevant market. Such measures will include – as ultima ratio – divestment orders (new Section 32f of the GWB).

In this blog-post we: explain the concept of sector inquiries under the GWB in general; and analyse the key amendments to the FCO’s sector inquiry powers, the most significant changes under the Reform.Continue Reading Sector Inquiries and the German new (and complicated) Competition Toolbox

Sustainability governs all policies and sectors of social and economic life. The goal of sustainable development is to meet the needs of today’s generations without compromising the self-sufficiency of future generations. Companies are called upon to innovate as economic conditions indicate a change in the direction of sustainability. Sustainability considerations and green developments have increasingly caught the attention of competition law’s enforcers. Competition authorities such as the European Commission (“Commission”), the Hellenic Competition Commission (“HCC”), the Dutch Competition Authority (“ACM”) and the German Competition Authority (“Bka”) have taken a positive stance towards accepting sustainability initiatives proposed by the private sector. How can companies balance both sustainability and competition law? In this blog post, we analyze recent developments that further explain the sustainability framework that companies have to navigate.Continue Reading Building a sustainability strategy – what companies can (not) do from a competition law perspective

On 22 June 2022, the EU’s General Court (“GC”) fully dismissed thyssenkrupp’s appeal against the European Commission’s (“Commission”) decision to block its proposed joint venture (“JV”) with Tata Steel in 2019.

This is the first time that the GC has considered the prohibition of a “gap” case under the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”) since it annulled the Commission’s prohibition of CK Hutchison’s proposed acquisition of Telefónica UK (O2) in 2020 (“CK Hutchison”) (see our previous blog post here). A “gap” case is a merger in an oligopolistic market that does not result in the creation or strengthening of an individual or collective dominant position. Rather, it risks causing a “significant impediment to effective competition”.

This result may indicate a return to a more traditional approach by the GC as regards “gap” cases than that demonstrated in the CK Hutchison judgment. The judgment also provides helpful guidance on the interpretation of the EUMR and other legal instruments (such as the Market Definition Notice and the Notice on Remedies). The key findings are:

  • Standard of proof: In order to block a “gap” merger, the Commission must show with a sufficient degree of probability that the transaction significantly impedes effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it.
  • SSNIP test: The Commission is not required to apply the SSNIP (small but significant and non-transitory increase in price) test when assessing substitutability between products — it is only one of the methods available to the Commission when defining the market.
  • Remedies: When assessing remedies, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the remedies remove the entire overlap between the merging parties or re-create fully the pre-merger structure in affected markets.
  • Requests for Information (“RFI”): There is no procedural error where the Commission fails to take additional steps (beyond sending systematic reminders) to ensure that recipients respond to an RFI.

Continue Reading EU General Court Upholds Tata Steel/thyssenkrupp JV Prohibition

On 30 May 2022, the European Union (“EU”) adopted the revised Regulation on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (No. 2022/869) (the “TEN-E Regulation 2022”), which replaces the previous rules laid down in Regulation No. 347/2013 (the “TEN-E Regulation 2013”) that aimed to improve security of supply, market integration, competition and sustainability in the energy sector. The TEN-E Regulation 2022 seeks to better support the modernisation of Europe’s cross-border energy infrastructures and the EU Green Deal objectives.

The three most important things you need to know about the TEN-E Regulation 2022:

  • Projects may qualify as Projects of Common Interest (“PCI”) and be selected on an EU list if (i) they fall within the identified priority corridors and (ii) help achieve EU’s overall energy and climate policy objectives in terms of security of supply and decarbonisation. The TEN-E Regulation 2022 updates its priority corridors to address the EU Green Deal objectives, while extending their scope to include projects connecting the EU with third countries, namely Projects of Mutual Interest (“PMI”).
  • PCIs and PMIs on the EU list must be given priority status to ensure rapid administrative and judicial treatment.
  • PCIs and PMIs will be eligible for EU financial assistance. Member States will also be able to grant financial support subject to State aid rules.

Continue Reading The European Union adopted new rules for the Trans-European Networks for Energy